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Abstract
I present a new perspective on the meaning of indistinguishability
of classical particles. This leads to a solution to the problem in statisti-
cal mechanics of justifying the inclusion of a factor N ! in a probability
distribution over the phase space of N indistinguishable classical par-
ticles.
1 Introduction
Considerations of the identity of objects have long been part of philosophical
discussion in the natural sciences and logic. These considerations became
particularly pertinent throughout the twentieth century with the develop-
ment of quantum physics, widely recognized as having interesting and far-
reaching implications concerning the identity, individuality, indiscernibility,
indistinguishability1 of the elementary components of our ontology. This
discussion continues in both the physics and philosophy literature2.
∗j.j.wills@lse.ac.uk
1. This menagerie of terms in the literature is apt to cause confusion, especially as there
is no clear consensus on what exactly each of these terms mean. Throughout the rest of the
paper, I will be concerned with giving a precise definition of a concept which I will label
‘indistinguishability’, and which, I think, matches with how most other commentators
use the word. But I believe it to be a distinct debate whether particles are ‘identical’,
‘individual’, or ‘indiscernible’. The literature I address in this paper therefore does not,
for example, overlap with the debate over the status of Leibniz’s PII.
2. See French (2000) for an introduction to this discussion and a comprehensive list of
references.
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Such considerations in classical physics have, by comparison, been largely
ignored. This trend has rightly been resisted in the philosophical and foun-
dational literature, but discussion of the idea has remained small in com-
parison to the (perhaps more glamorous?) discussion in quantum theory.
It is strange that this is the case, since considerations of particle indistin-
guishability in physics actually first made their debut in Gibbs’ work on
classical statistical mechanics (Darrigol 1991, p. 239). Gibbs used the no-
tion of particle indistinguishability to argue for the introduction of a factor
N ! in the probability distribution over the phase space for a system of N
‘entirely similar’ particles. It is here where the problem of giving a rigorous
justification for the N ! factor originates.
The question of whether, and if so in what precise sense, classical par-
ticles are indistinguishable has consequences in physics and its philosophy:
arguments which aim to justify the inclusion of the N ! factor generally as-
sume that it is needed to derive an extensive entropy function. The basic
worry is that a non-extensive entropy function yields a non-zero entropy of
mixing of indistinguishable samples of gas, contradicting the prediction of
thermodynamics that it is zero. This contradiction is one version of Gibbs’
paradox3, and seeking a justification for the N ! factor is often taken to be
synonymous with seeking a solution to the paradox. The argument I will
present follows the trend in the philosophical literature by taking seriously
the idea of indistinguishable classical particles, but does not take as its basic
motivation the derivation of an extensive entropy function. In fact, I think
it is a virtue of my analysis that it shows that a rigorous derivation of the N !
factor can be obtained on a very general level, independent of any particular
probability measure and independent of what we use the probability mea-
sure to compute. This shows that the N ! problem is not a problem specific
to the entropy, but rather a deep puzzle in the foundations of statistical
mechanics.
However, Gibbs’ treatment of indistinguishable particles is beset by am-
biguous and imprecisely defined terms (what exactly does it mean for classi-
cal particles to be ‘indistinguishable’?). This lack of clarity has resulted in a
surprisingly diverse collection of justifications for theN ! factor. Some promi-
nent textbook authors like Huang (1963), ter Haar (1966), and Blundell and
Blundell (2010) appeal to quantum mechanics, arguing that the insertion of
the N ! in classical physics was necessary but not justifiable until quantum
3. See van Kampen (1984), Denbigh and Redhead (1989), Jaynes (1992), Dieks (2011,
2013), Saunders (2013), van Lith (2018), and Swendsen (2018) for a sample of the debate
from the perspective of seeking an extensive entropy function.
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mechanics came along with its associated ‘fundamental indistinguishability
of identical particles’. Indeed, much of the modern discussion and teaching
of the physics of indistinguishable particles occurs in the context of quantum
mechanics. In contrast, philosophers and those working in the foundations
of physics have supplied arguments which defend the coherence of the idea of
the indistinguishable classical particle. For example, Saunders (2013, 2018)
supplies a justification of the N ! factor on the basis of a notion of classical
particle indistinguishability as defined by the intrinsic properties of classical
particles like mass and charge. On the other hand, Dieks (2013) argues that
the ‘distinguishability’ of classical particles means that the N ! should not
be included after all.
In this paper, I present an analysis of classical particle indistinguishabil-
ity as ‘observational indistinguishability’ in a certain mathematically precise
sense. I will argue that this leads to a number of interesting and welcome
consequences in the foundations of statistical mechanics:
1. The identification and resolution of shortcomings in the ongoing debate
concerning the solution to the N ! problem.
2. A reinterpretation of the quotienting procedure typically used to jus-
tify the N ! term and a rigorous derivation of the N ! factor which does
not appeal to the metaphysics of particles and which rather draws only
on facts about observables.
3. A reinterpretation and reconstruction of Gibbs’ own argument as a
special case of my analysis in which particles are observationally in-
distinguishable with respect to the Hamiltonian. I call this ‘dynamical
indistinguishability’.
In Section 2, I present the necessary formalism and concepts of classical
statistical mechanics in order to state a precise formulation of the N ! prob-
lem. In Section 3, I critically evaluate two prominent approaches to the N !
factor debate. In Section 4, I demonstrate that considerations of observabil-
ity are crucial to understanding the sense in which states may be said to be
‘equivalent’ for the purpose of gathering statistics, and I offer a new per-
spective on the nature of reduction via quotienting in classical mechanics.
In Section 5, I offer a reconstruction of Gibbs’ argument for which I develop
a precise definition of classical particle indistinguishability in terms of the
symmetries of the dynamics. In Section 6, I use this definition to finally
derive the N ! factor.
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2 Gibbs’ Statistical Mechanics
In classical statistical mechanics4, the main object of study is the Hamilto-
nian system. This is a triple 〈M,ω, h〉 where M , a smooth manifold repre-
senting the possible states of the system, together with ω, the symplectic
form supplying M with geometric structure, form the phase space. Given
a Hamiltonian, h : M → R, the symplectic form ω determines a unique
dynamical trajectory through each point in phase space. The dynamical
trajectories are the integral curves of the vector field H generated by h via
the symplectic form thus:
wabH
a = dbh (1)
where dbh is the exterior derivative of h. We interpret the different integral
curves with various initial conditions as representing the possible dynamical
trajectories the system may follow from the various initial states represented
by those points. Dynamical trajectories may also be viewed as maps ϕt :
M →M which take points in M and output points in M , t units along the
integral curve from the initial point. The collection of these maps {ϕt}t∈R
forms a one-parameter group of diffeomorphisms and is called the phase
flow.
When the points in the phase space for a system of n degrees of free-
dom are given local coordinates (q1, ..., qn, p1, ..., pn), where q1, ..., qn are the
generalized configuration variables and the p1, ..., pn are the generalized mo-
menta, Equation (1) takes on the more familiar form of Hamilton’s equa-
tions:
q˙i =
∂h
∂pi
, p˙i = − ∂h
∂qi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (2)
Now we introduce the statistical part. In introducing his statistical me-
chanical framework, Gibbs invites us to
imagine a great number of systems of the same nature, but dif-
fering in the configurations and velocities which they have at a
given instant. (Gibbs 1902, p. iii)
4. I choose to present the Gibbs rather than the Boltzmann version of statistical me-
chanics. This is partly because the problem I am concerned with first originated with
Gibbs. Despite this, many authors in the modern philosophical literature (like Saunders
(2013) and Dieks (2013) which I discuss below) choose to state the problem in the Boltz-
mann framework. Happily though, this does not affect the solution of the problem since,
ultimately, all the action occurs in the probability measure over the phase space which is
a feature common to both Gibbs and Boltzmann versions.
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This collection of systems is known as the ensemble: an enormous collection
of copies of the system under study which contains all of the possible ways
the actual system could be at an instant. It is important to recognize that
the ensemble is not (for example) the collection of particles in the actual box
of gas itself; it consists of possible, not actual, copies of the entire system.
And it is the ensemble, not the actual system, that is the object of study in
Gibbs’ statistical mechanics:
And here we may set the problem, not to follow a particular
system through its succession of configurations, but to determine
how the whole number of systems will be distributed among the
various conceivable configurations and velocities at any required
time, when the distribution has been given for some one time.
The fundamental equation for this inquiry is that which gives the
rate of change of the number of systems which fall within any
infinitesimal limits of configuration and velocity. (Gibbs 1902,
p. iii)
He is not concerned with the traditional mechanical problem of how a par-
ticular state of the system changes in time but rather with the problem of
how the distribution of a number of systems over the possible states changes
with time.
We are invited to imagine that the ensemble of systems is distributed
in a particular way among the possible mechanical states in phase space.
This distribution D on phase space tells us how many systems N in an
ensemble are associated with a given region R of the phase space, through
the following definition:
N(R) :=
∫
R
D(p, q) dp1...dqn. (3)
Gibbs callsD(p, q) the density-in-phase and dp1...dqn an element of extension-
in-phase5.
The total number of systems in the ensemble N := N(M) is given by
Equation (3) for R = M . We can normalize D by defining P (p, q) :=
D(p, q)/N , which Gibbs calls the probability coefficient6. We can then define
µ(R) :=
∫
R
P (p, q) dp1...dqn. (4)
5. In modern language, this is known as the ‘volume form’ or ‘Liouville form’ associated
with the symplectic manifold (M,ω), given by ωn = dq1 ∧ dp1 ∧ · · · dqn ∧ dpn.
6. In modern language, this is a ‘probability density function’.
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This defines the measure of a region R ⊆M . We then define
P(R) := µ(R)
µ(M)
(5)
to be the probability of region R. Its intended interpretation is as the
probability that a system picked out of the ensemble is found in region R of
the phase space. In Gibbs’ words, it expresses
[the] ratio of the number of systems falling within those limits to
the whole number of systems. This is the same as the probability
that an unspecified system of the ensemble [...] will lie within
the given limits. (Gibbs 1902, p. 17)
This quotation suggests that the talk of ensembles of great numbers of sys-
tems is just a concrete way of interpreting the probability measure in a
frequentist manner. However, in using Gibbs’ formalism, we are not com-
mitted to the existence of this ensemble of systems7. The important message
is that the central object of study in Gibbsian statistical mechanics is the
probability measure over the phase space. Physics proceeds by computing
expectation values for certain observables which are then compared with
experiment.
Much of Gibbs’ 1902 book studied the probability coefficients of arbi-
trary Hamiltonian systems of n degrees of freedom interacting with different
environments. For example, the first probability coefficient he studied was
the canonical distribution. He interpreted this to model systems which could
exchange energy with their constant-temperature environment. He then in-
troduced the micro-canonical distribution to study the properties of systems
with a fixed energy. If a physicist wants to study the properties of their par-
ticular system when it is in contact with a heat bath (for example), all
they have to do is take the canonical distribution, which Gibbs has already
worked out and apply it to their particular system, effectively endowing the
canonical coordinates with certain interpretations. For example, for a single
point particle with three degrees of freedom, the generalized configuration
variables represent the particle’s x, y and z position coordinates and the
generalized momenta represent the particle’s linear momentum along the x,
y and z axes. It is at this stage where the problem we are concerned with
arises.
7. Mathematically, all we have is a probability distribution over M . How we are to
interpret this probability is a matter of debate. See Myrvold (2017) for a discussion of the
main issues.
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While Gibbs spent most of his book studying arbitrary systems of n
degrees of freedom, in the last chapter of his book he did apply his methods
to a particular system: a collection of N point particles8. In applying his
methods to this system, he expressed the following problem:
If two phases differ only in that certain entirely similar particles
have changed places with one another, are they to be regarded
as identical or different phases? (Gibbs 1902, p. 187)
This quote requires some interpretation. The 6N -dimensional phase space
of a system of N point particles has phase points (also known as phases) s
of the form of a 6N tuple:
s = (r1x, r1y, r1z, p1x, p1y, p1x, ..., rNx, rNy, rNz, pNx, pNy, pNz) (6)
Or, more briefly
s = ((r,p)1, ..., (r,p)N ) (7)
where r = (rx, ry, rz) and p = (px, py, pz). We are to think of this tuple as
consisting of N ‘slots’, known as factor positions, each of which represents
one of theN particles, and into which go three position coordinates and three
momentum coordinates specifying the single particle state. This phase point
represents the state of the N particle system, made up of N single particle
states. Now consider the family of transformations {piij} for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N
whose elements swap the blocks of six canonical coordinates, which is to say
they swap the single-particle states, among the factor positions i and j. For
example, the transformation pi1N : M →M is defined so that
pi1N (s) := ((r,p)N , ..., (r,p)1). (8)
Let us refer to these transformations as permutations. The permutations piij
effectively change which particle has which position and momentum. It is
easily checked that these permutations are canonical transformations, a fact
which will be useful to us later.
8. This last chapter is known for the grand canonical distribution, used in modelling
systems of particles in which the particle number is allowed to vary (in chemical reactions,
for example). Indeed, it is in the mathematical expression of the grand canonical distri-
bution where the problem I discuss first appeared. However, the discussion and solution
to the problem will not depend on any particular probability distribution; the problem
would appear if we applied the canonical, micro-canonical or another distribution to the
N particle system.
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The permutation piij is sometimes described as a ‘permutation of particle
labels’ (French and Rickles 2003) or as a ‘permutation of particles among the
states’ (Dieks 1990; Saunders 2013). These images are tempting, but they
can be misleading as to what the permutations {piij} really do. Firstly, we
cannot think of particles as being permuted among states since this invites
the image of phase points remaining fixed, like boxes, and particles being
permuted between them. In fact, the formalism indicates that we should
think of the particles like boxes (they are represented by the factor positions)
as remaining fixed while the states (blocks of six coordinates) are permuted
among them. Nor can the maps be interpreted passively as a permutation
of particle labels since, strictly speaking, there are no labels for the map to
act on; all that the N tuple consists in is factor positions and single particle
states. It is possible to interpret the labels as names referring to the factor
positions (the label ‘A’ would just be shorthand for ‘the first factor position
in the tuple’ and so on), and if we must talk of labels then this is how they
should be interpreted, but this still does not capture what the maps do since,
again, the factor positions remain fixed. As defined, these maps act on N
tuples and return N tuples by permuting single particle states among the
factor positions. The piij do not permute particle labels over particles, or
particles over states: they permute states over particles9.
Now Gibbs poses the following question: what if the particles represented
by factor positions i and j are ‘entirely similar’ or ‘indistinguishable’? The
transformation piij certainly takes s to a different phase point piij(s) ∈ M ,
s 6= piij(s), but are the states represented by piij(s) and s, in some sense,
equivalent? It is tempting to say in this case that if the particles are ‘indis-
tinguishable’, it does not ‘matter’ which particle has which single particle
state and so the states represented by the phase point s and its permuted
counterpart piij(s) are in some sense equivalent. This is a common interpre-
tation of Gibbs’ reasoning here, for he writes:
If the particles are regarded as indistinguishable, it seems in
accordance with the spirit of the statistical method to regard
the phases as identical. (Gibbs 1902, p. 187)
If all N particles were ‘indistinguishable’ from each other, then it seems that
9. The distinction between permuting particles over states and permuting states over
particles has made made in the context of quantum theory: French and Krause (2006,
p. 136) note that we may think about permutation both ways in the context of ordinary
statistics but that the distinction becomes important in the context of parastatistics. In
this paper, however, we restrict ourselves strictly to classical Hamiltonian mechanics for
a contained discussion.
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the phase space is over-representing the physical states; each physical state
is represented by N ! points in the phase space since N single particle states
over N factor positions admit of N ! distinct permutations of single particle
states over particles. This has a knock-on effect on the probability measure:
if the physical states are over-represented in M , the standard probability
measure over M developed in the earlier part of Gibbs’ book for arbitrary
systems would be over-counting the states. Gibbs corrects for this10 by
dividing the probability measure by N !. More precisely, if µ is the measure
derived from the general reasoning of earlier chapters (see Equation (4)),
the measure for the N particle system would be µ/N ! to correct for the
over-counting of the states by µ.
The terms Gibbs uses are open for interpretation: what is meant by
‘entirely similar’ or ‘indistinguishable’? What does it mean to say that
the phases are ‘identical’? Is this to be read as logical identity? Or some
other notion of equivalence? These ambiguities have led to a number of
views regarding the N ! factor. In the next Section, I critically evaluate two
prominent views, taking certain parts of their arguments as inspiration for
my own derivation of the factor and for my answers to these questions.
3 N ! Justifications
In this Section, I turn to discussing and critically evaluating the arguments
of Dieks and Saunders, two prominent representatives of different views
regarding the N ! factor. This will help set the scene for the alternative view
I will defend in this paper.
3.1 Dieks’ Classical Particle Distinguishability
Dennis Dieks gives an argument against the inclusion of the N ! factor, based
on the idea that classical particles cannot be indistinguishable at all because
they are always distinguishable by their trajectories in configuration space.
The thrust of his argument is expressed here:
[C]lassical particles can be named and distinguished by their
different histories. A process in which two classical particles of
10. In the original text, Gibbs considers the more general case in which the gas consists
of numbers of particles of different kinds so his factor is N1!N2!...Nh! where 1, ..., h indexes
the different kinds of particles in the gas such that particles of kind 1 are ‘indistinguishable’
from each other but ‘distinguishable’ from any other kind. We work with the simpler case
of N particles of the same kind for simplicity and without loss of generality.
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the same kind are interchanged can therefore certainly produce a
different microstate. Indeed, imagine a situation in which there
is one particle at position [r1] and one particle at position [r2],
and in which at a later instant there is again one particle at [r1]
and one at [r2]; suppose that their respective momenta are the
same as before. What has happened in the meantime? There
are two possibilities: either the particle that was first at [r1] is
later again at [r1] and the particle that was first at [r2] is later
again at [r2], or the particles have exchanged their positions.
The latter case would clearly be different from the former one:
it corresponds to a different physical process. Although it is true
that the two final situations cannot be distinguished on the basis
of their instantaneous properties, their different histories show
that the particle at [r1] in one final situation is not the same
as the particle at [r1] in the other final situation. (Dieks 2013,
p. 27)
The situation Dieks has in mind here is depicted in Figure 1. Let the initial
(a) Initial state (b) Final state (swap) (c) Final state (no swap)
Figure 1: (a) is the initial state of a system consisting of two particles in
a container. The arrows indicate their velocities. States (b) and (c) are
the final states of particles after they follow trajectories which lead them to
swapping and not swapping, respectively. The black dot depicts the particle
represented by the first factor position and the white dot depicts the particle
represented by the second factor position.
state (a) be represented by the phase point s = (r1, p1, r2, p2). And let
state (b) be the final state of the two particles if they swap, taking the
system to the state pi12(s) = (r2, p2, r1, p1), where pi12 : M → M is the
permutation, acting on the single particle states in the factor positions 1
and 2. This transformation represents the process in which the particle
(represented by the first factor position, coloured black in the diagram)
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which initially had (r1, p1) now has (r2, p2) and the particle (represented by
the second factor position, coloured white in the diagram) which initially
had (r2, p2) now has (r1, p1). The particles have swapped single particle
states. State (c) shows the final state of the two particles if they do not
swap, the system returning to the state s. The puzzle here is that if the
particles are ‘of the same kind’, ‘entirely similar’, or ‘indistinguishable’ then
the states pi12(s) and s are in a sense equivalent, since in each there is
one particle at position r1 with momentum p1 and another at position r2
with momentum p2; physically, it might not seem to matter which particle
has which position and momentum. Dieks argues that although the states
are not distinguishable via their ‘instantaneous properties’, the particles in
Figure 1b followed different trajectories in configuration space to those in 1c.
So, when we take the histories into account, it does seem to ‘matter’ which
particle is which. In this sense, the particles are clearly distinguishable via
their trajectories and therefore the states pi12(s) and s are, in another sense,
not equivalent. Which is the correct sense of equivalence to take? Dieks
argues that the histories are relevant to considerations of the equivalence of
the states and so he concludes that the states are distinct.
In order to evaluate the argument, let me put it in a more formal setting.
Note first of all that the system in which the particles do not swap must
have a different dynamics than the system in which the particles do swap.
More formally, representing the dynamics as the phase flow after some fixed
time ϕt : M →M , then it must be the case that:
ϕ¬swap : s 7→ s (9)
ϕswap : s 7→ pi12(s) (10)
In other words, if the system is to evolve under the dynamics to some
phase point other than s, then the phase flow must be different. Each phase
flow is generated by the corresponding Hamiltonian hswap and h¬swap. But
the Hamiltonian is a function of the phase—indeed, it is the energy—and
thus is exactly the sort of object that may fairly be called an ‘instantaneous
property’ of the system. Therefore, the two final states in Figures 1b and 1c
can in fact be distinguished on the basis of their instantaneous properties,
since the Hamiltonian in each case is different. It is exactly because the
states are different in virtue of their different Hamiltonians that the states
have different trajectories in phase space.
Therefore, what Dieks has really told us is that the phase point s in
the phase space of dynamical system 〈M,ω, h¬swap〉 is a different state from
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pi12(s) in the phase space of dynamical system 〈M,ω, hswap〉. However, this
is not the question we are really trying to answer. What we want to know
is whether s in the phase space of some dynamical system is in some sense
equivalent to pi12(s) in the phase space of the very same dynamical system.
What are we to say about the sense in which the states represented by s
and pi12(s) are equivalent?
3.2 Saunders’ Classical Particle Indistinguishability
Saunders (2013, 2018) supplies an answer to this question as part of an ar-
gument justifying the inclusion of the N ! factor in the context of Boltzmann
statistical mechanics. If the particles are identical11, understood to mean
that the particles share all state-independent properties (like charge, mass
and spin), then the states piij(s) and s (for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N) represent one and
the same physical state (the sense of equivalence used here being identity).
This representational redundancy of the phase space then needs to be re-
moved by passing to the reduced phase space, M ′ = M/SN : the quotient
of the phase space under the action of SN , the permutation group
12. Points
in the reduced space may be understood as equivalence classes [s] each con-
taining N ! elements all related to the s ∈ M by the permutations pi ∈ SN .
Quotienting under this group effectively identifies points in the unreduced
phase space related by these permutations. More informally, the unreduced
phase space points are read as saying, ‘the first particle has this position
and momentum, the second particle has that position and momentum, and
so on’ while the points in the reduced phase space are read as saying ‘some
particle has this position and momentum and another particle has that po-
sition and momentum, and so on’ While it is possible to make statements
about which particle has which position and momentum in the unreduced
space, it is not possible to say which is which in the reduced space.
This reduction has the desired effect on the probability measure. Let
there be a measure µ on the unreduced space M such that µ(M) = 1 (it is
normalized) and let µ′ be the measure on the reduced space M ′ obtained
through the quotienting procedure. We may embed M ′ to M by mapping
the points [s] ∈ M ′ to some point [s] 3 si ∈ M, 1 ≤ i ≤ N !. This maps M ′
onto some region R ⊂ M . Carrying µ′ over to M then allows allows us to
11. This term is not meant in the strict logical sense of ‘one and the same’, but it is widely
used, so I adopt it. In the philosophical literature, particle identity has been treated with
significant sophistication and precision. See, for example, Caulton and Butterfield (2011,
2012) and French (1989).
12. SN contains N ! elements which are generated by the transformations piij .
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compare µ′ and µ on the same space. Since µ(R) = 1/N !, and R can be
mapped to the entire reduced space, it follows that µ′(M ′) = µ(R) = 1/N !
resulting in the desired N ! factor.
There are two key steps in this argument that I will focus on. These are:
1. Focusing on the key question of whether the points in M related by
some pi ∈ SN represent ‘one and the same’ physical state. The criterion
for this was taken to be: the points s and piij(s) represent one and the
same physical state just in case the particles represented by factor
positions i and j are identical.
2. If the states are equivalent in this sense, then the points s and piij(s) are
to be identified by quotienting M under the action of the permutation
group.
I take issue with the first, and therefore am not convinced by the second. My
critique is the subject of the next Section. In its place I will propose a new
and mathematically precise perspective on the equivalence of states, which
in turn gives rise to a novel interpretation of the quotienting procedure.
4 Observables and Statistics
If we assume that the job of the state space in a typical dynamical theory
is to represent completely and without redundancy all the possible ways a
system can be at an instant, then the question in step one of whether two
states are ‘one and the same’ physical state is pertinent. The situation in
statistical mechanics, however, is slightly different. While we are ostensibly
studying a dynamical system, it is not the primary object of study. This is
because statistical mechanics is a statistical theory and, as such, it is not
immediately concerned with the evolution of the state of the system, but
rather with studying a probability space. This is a triple (Ω,F , µ) where Ω
is the sample space whose elements are called outcomes, F is a σ-algebra
on Ω whose elements are called events and µ : F → [0, 1] is a countably
additive probability measure. This shift in focus is important: while the job
of the state space M is to completely represent all the possible states of the
dynamical system, the job of the subsets of Ω is to be the events to which
probabilities are attached. In the previous section, it was tacitly assumed
that Ω was M , but this will not, in general, be the case, as I will show shortly.
It is important to realize that M and Ω are conceptually different entities
with different roles vis-a`-vis what they aim to represent. The importance of
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noting this difference and its relevance to statistical mechanics is the topic
of this section.
In a typical statistical analysis using a probability space, the job of Ω
is to represent the set of possible outcomes or results of an experiment
or observation while F represents the set of possible events which are as-
signed probabilities (c.f. Billingsley 1995, p. 17). I would like to draw atten-
tion to the seemingly innocuous role of observation in defining the sample
space. The appearance of observation in the standard interpretation of
a probability space is, I think, very telling and important. We can only
collect statistical data and determine the relative frequencies of various el-
ements of F when the outcomes in the sample space are observationally
distinguishable from one another. Therefore, considerations of what counts
as observable must be accounted for when specifying the sample space.
To give a really simple example: we have two coins to be flipped at the
same time, each of which can either land heads (H) or tails (T ) and with
one coloured red (R) and the other green (G). If the experimenter toss-
ing the coins and recording relative frequency data is colourblind, it will
only be possible for them to collect statistical information with the sam-
ple space {(H,H), (H,T ), (T, T )}, even though the state space is in fact
{(GH,RH), (GT,RH), (GH,RT ), (GT,RT )}. That is, the sample space is
constrained by the observables the experimenter has available. With re-
spect to the observables available to the colourblind experimenter, the states
(GT,RH and (GH,RT ) are observationally indistinguishable.
Given that the primary object of study in statistical mechanics is the
probability space, we should be in the business of constructing the sample
space. And given that observational considerations are inextricably bound
up in the standard characterisation of a sample space, we must pay close at-
tention to the observable in constructing the sample space for the N particle
system. These considerations of what is observable will help to pin down the
relevant notion of state equivalence to use in constructing our sample space:
we should not be asking whether two points represent one and the same
state but rather whether they are observationally equivalent. This is an im-
portant difference, since states may be observationally equivalent while not
being one and the same state13. We therefore need a precise characterisation
of observational equivalence of states in classical mechanics.
13. Note that, in constructing the sample space, we are not making any claims about
which states are ‘really’ equivalent. We are in fact not modifying the phase space in any
way at all, but rather building a new space, constrained by the observables, on which to
subsequently define probabilities and do statistical mechanics. The argument presented
here is, therefore, compatible with any empirically adequate phase space ontology.
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Observable quantities in classical mechanics are represented by classical
observables. These are smooth, real valued functions on the manifold f :
M → R, assigning a real number to each state. This allows us to define
precisely what it means for two states to be observationally equivalent.
Observational Equivalence. States s and s′ are observationally equivalent
with respect to a set of observables {fi} if and only if fi(s) = fi(s′) for all
fi.
This definition provides a schema for constructing the sample space. Simply
identify your favourite set of smooth functions and build your sample space
containing all and only states which are observationally distinct (inequiva-
lent) with respect to that set.
We may consider a close cousin of Saunders’ view as an instance of
this schema in which we interpret his talk of particle properties in terms of
observables. The next step is to interpret the claim that the particles have
the same intrinsic properties in terms of classical observables. We cannot
read the intrinsic properties of the particles, such as charge and mass, in
the N particle system from the state since this only gives us position and
momentum values. In fact, we read intrinsic properties of the particles from
the classical observables. This is best illustrated with an example: if we
want to say that the particles all have the same mass, we would formalize
this in terms of the permutation symmetry of some classical observable, like
the kinetic energy14. Thus, consider:
1. K = (p21 + p
2
2)/2m;
2. K ′ = p21/2m+ p22/2M , m 6= M .
The variables p1 and p2 pick out the momentum values in the factor positions
1 and 2 respectively. K is left invariant under the permutation pi12 since
K(s) = K(pi12(s)) for all s, while K
′ is not so invariant. We can say then
that the particles represented by factor positions 1 and 2 have the same
mass if and only if the kinetic energy observable is invariant under the
permutation pi12. This is one interpretation of what it means for particles
to have the same mass. Similarly, having the same value of other particle
properties such as charge and spin will also be understood formally in terms
of the permutation symmetry (or not) of some observable(s).
14. This will not be the only classical observable invariant under this transformation,
but it is the obvious one to consider.
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Thus, while Saunders’ view says that the necessary condition for states s
and piij(s) to be identified in the quotienting procedure is that the particles
share all state independent properties, the close cousin of Saunders’ view
would say that the necessary condition for the states to be identified in the
quotienting procedure is that the states must be observationally equivalent
with respect to all observables. This view is an instance of the schema with
{fi} being the set of all smooth functions.
This instance of the schema has an undesirable consequence for Saunders
with respect to step 2: it implies that no two distinct states in phase space
are ever observationally equivalent:
Proposition. Let s, s′ ∈ M , where M is a smooth connected manifold. If
f(s) = f(s′) for all smooth functions f : M → R, then s = s′.
Proof. Suppose f(s) = f(s′) for all functions f , and let C be any curve on
M containing s and s′. Now let f be any smooth function that increases
strictly monotonically along C. Then since f(s) = f(s′) and s, s′ are both
on C, it follows that s = s′.
Therefore, if we require two states to be observationally equivalent with
respect to all observables before identifying the states in the quotienting
procedure, then quotienting will not actually do anything, since no two
distinct states are observationally equivalent in this sense.
However, one could reasonably respond that to require observational
equivalence with respect to all observables is an impossibly strong epistemic
requirement. There is the inevitable experimental limitation that we are
able to measure only a few observables. If we want a useful σ-algebra whose
events we can actually observationally distinguish, then the sample space
had better contain all and only the states observationally distinguishable
with respect to some subset of the observables, such as those we can measure.
This claim has two important implications.
The first implication affects step 2: the quotienting procedure. The
goal of reduction is to remove representational redundancy in the phase
space by identifying states (deemed physically identical) in the unreduced
space as one state in the reduced space. That aim is sometimes viewed as
metaphysical: it is to achieve a bijection between physically possible states
of the system and points in the state space15. This, however, is not the goal
of a statistical theory, such as statistical mechanics. All we require of our
15. See Castellani (2003, p. 434), Belot (2003, p. 410) and Butterfield (2007, pp. 23–
4) for examples of this view. Examples of state space reduction typically occur in the
relationist-substantivalist debate in spacetime physics.
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sample space is that the elements of Ω be distinguishable with respect to
some set of empirically accessible (measurable) observables. In fact, given
our observational and experimental limitations, we know that the elements
of the sample space may correspond to many genuinely distinct possibilities
in the state space (recall that this was the lesson of the coin example).
Since we inevitably do not have access to all the classical observables, this
is our situation in statistical mechanics. So, if we wish to retain the ability
to interpret phase space as representing distinct physical possibilities, then
reducing the phase space is not the correct procedure to carry out, since this
would identify states known to be genuinely distinct.
One way around this problem is to re-interpret the reduction procedure;
instead of interpreting the reduced space as a state space in one-to-one cor-
respondence with genuine possibilities, we could interpret it as a sample
space, claiming to represent all and only the observationally distinct states
without claiming to represent all and only the genuine physical possibili-
ties. If interpreted this way, the reduction procedure can be carried out in
a representationally accurate way. This interpretation is non-standard since
reduction is typically used to eliminate the over-representation of possibil-
ities. But nothing in the mathematics of reduction dictates any particular
interpretation of the procedure; if we think of quotienting in terms of forming
equivalence classes of states in M , we are at liberty to quotient with respect
to any equivalence relation which suits our purposes. Typically, this relation
is taken to be ‘...is identical to...’ or ‘...is physically equivalent to...’ but
we may just as well take the relation to be ‘...is observationally equivalent
to...’ In the rest of the paper, however, I will adopt a position which does
not require reduction under any interpretation. This position has a number
of virtues and advantages over re-interpreting reduction which I explain in
Section 6.
The second implication is more pressing because it also affects the possi-
ble ways out of the problem posed by the first implication. Since no distinct
states are observationally equivalent with respect to all observables, which
subset of observables will give us a fruitful definition of observational equiv-
alence? A fruitful definition would be one which allows us to construct a
sample space which is actually useful, that is, contains all and only the out-
comes which are observationally distinct with respect to observables avail-
able to an experimenter. This set is clearly dependent on the experimental
context and our epistemic situation and therefore there will be no ‘one true’
fruitful definition of observational equivalence.
In the next Section, I will consider one particular definition of observa-
tional equivalence resulting from choosing the subset of observables to be
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the singleton set containing the Hamiltonian. I will show how this results in
the N ! correction factor used by Gibbs and a precise definition of classical
particle indistinguishability in terms of dynamical symmetries. But realize
that this is only one possible way of filling in the observational equivalence
schema: the division by N ! results from specifying a particular choice for
{fi}. Thus the ‘N ! problem’ is a specific instance of the much more general
‘over-counting problem’. Depending on the choice of observables, we will in
general correct by a different factor.
5 Dynamical Equivalence of States and the Dy-
namical Indistinguishability of Particles
A hint that {fi} = {h} is the correct starting point for interpreting and
reconstructing Gibbs is provided by Uffink. On introducing ‘indistinguish-
able’ particles, he makes the following comment (in a footnote) on what that
might mean:
Presumably, these terms mean (at least) that the Hamiltonian
is invariant under their permutation, i.e. they have equal mass
and interact in exactly the same way. (Uffink 2007, p. 997)
The hint that the indistinguishability of particles is grounded in some sym-
metry of the energy observable (the Hamiltonian) is very promising, but it
certainly requires further argument16. The energy observable is but one of
many smooth functions on phase space: why choose this one with respect
to which to judge the (in)distinguishability of the particles and the obser-
vational equivalence of the states? In the following sections I develop in
detail the line of thought inspired by this hint and I show that it results in
a precise definition of classical particle indistinguishability, and a rigorous
derivation of the N ! factor.
We shall call observational equivalence with respect to the Hamiltonian17
h in which {fi} = {h}, dynamical equivalence, to be defined more precisely
below. But first, this view does require some motivation.
This position is motivated by the thought that a minimal, necessary con-
dition for two states of a dynamical system to be observationally equivalent
16. This hint carries through straightforwardly to the discussion in quantum theory, in
the form that the permutation operator commutes with the Hamiltonian. However, I
restrict this paper to the discussion in classical Hamiltonian mechanics.
17. The Hamiltonian which is the third element of the dynamical system triple (M,ω, h).
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is that they have identical dynamical evolutions. It should not be possible to
count states as observationally equivalent for the purposes of constructing
the sample space if they have different dynamical evolutions.
Is the condition sufficient? It is clearly not sufficient for observational
equivalence, since taking {fi} = {h} allows the states to differ with respect
to any number of other observables, if these differences do not make any
difference to their dynamical evolutions. For example, the particles may all
have different colours but if the dynamics is ‘colourblind’, then it should not
matter if this particle is blue and that one red or this one red and that one
blue. They do, nevertheless, differ with respect to the ‘colour’ observable.
Recall, however, that our aim is to find the set of observables sufficient for
our statistical aim of constructing the sample space and correct probability
distribution for our Hamiltonian system.
An argument that {h} is sufficient for this purpose comes from Chapter
IV in Gibbs’ book in which he arrives at the canonical distribution. He
begins by singling out as worthy of study the distributions P which are
stationary. That is, those which satisfy
P˙ = {P, h} = 0 (11)
where {P, h} is the Poisson bracket of P and h. He notes that it is necessary
and sufficient that P be a function only of the phase for this condition to
be satisfied. We may further constrain P by requiring that they define a
probability measure over M by satisfying Equations (4) and (5). In Gibbs’
terminology, the conditions specified by Equations (4), (5) and (11) combine
to form the condition for statistical equilibrium. This still leaves the func-
tional form of P underdetermined, so Gibbs places a further constraint on
P : based on the restriction of his study to conservative mechanical systems,
he stipulates P to be some function of the energy:
P (s) = α(h(s)) for some α : R→ R for all s ∈M. (12)
Part of the reason for this stipulation is, no doubt, to focus discussion
on particular probability coefficients; taking P to be some function of the
energy is an easy and natural way to satisfy the condition for statistical
equilibrium. However, it is a mathematical fact that {P, h} = 0 for a con-
servative system does not imply that P must be some function of the energy.
Gibbs’s stipulation that this be so therefore appears rather arbitrary from
a philosophical point of view.
However, it is a fact that Gibbs restricted his attention to stationary
probability coefficients which were some function of the energy. Insofar as
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we are in the business of reconstructing Gibbs’ reasoning, or indeed any
reasoning which restricts attention to functions of the energy, dynamical
equivalence is appropriate.
I now develop a precise statement of dynamical equivalence. Consider
the phase flow ϕt generated by h and the particular trajectory
t 7→ ϕt(s) ∈M (13)
with initial condition s. Now compare the trajectory with initial condition
pi(s) for some pi ∈ SN :
t 7→ ϕt(pi(s)) (14)
We also define the permutation of the curve t 7→ ϕt(s) ∈M as
t 7→ pi(ϕt(s)) (15)
This is just like the curve t 7→ ϕt(s) except that every point along the curve
has been acted upon by pi. Intuitively, it is the very same trajectory, differing
only in the factor positions of the single particle states. This motivates a
definition for states s and pi(s) to be dynamically equivalent.
pi-Dynamical Equivalence. States s and pi(s) are pi-dynamically equiva-
lent if and only if ϕt(pi(s)) = pi(ϕt(s)), for all t.
In words, this asks you to compare two trajectories and starting at some
point and the permuted version of that point. If they are the same tra-
jectory up to permutation pi, then the states are pi-dynamically equivalent.
Abstracting away from particular trajectories, this becomes: if the transfor-
mation pi leaves the hamiltonian flow invariant, then we say that the states
s and pi(s) are pi-dynamically equivalent.
This definition does not yet look like an instance of the observational
equivalence schema in Section 4. However, we can prove that it is equivalent
to one such instance using the following result: if a canonical transforma-
tion leaves the hamiltonian flow invariant, then this leaves the Hamiltonian
invariant up to an additive constant. The geometric proof goes as follows18.
Proposition. Given a symplectic manifold (M,ω), let ϕt : M → M be
the Hamiltonian flow generated by the smooth function h : M → R. Let
pi : M →M be a symplectomorphism (canonical transformation), such that
pi∗ω = ω where pi∗ is the pushforward of pi. Then: ϕt◦pi = ϕt iff h◦pi = h+f0
where f0 is a constant function.
18. An equivalent proposition and proof may be found in Corollary 8 in Arnol’d (1978,
pp. 217–8)
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Proof. →. A Hamiltonian flow for h is a set of integral curves threading
the vector field H. So the proposition is equivalent to the statement that
pi∗H = H iff h ◦ pi = h + f0. H is defined to satisfy ωabHa = dbh. Writing
the inverse of ωab as ω
ab, we have Ha = ωabdbh. So pi
∗H = H is to say
pi∗ωabdbh = ωabdbh. Since pi∗ is a symplectomorphism, ωabpi∗dbh = ωabdbh.
Applying ωab to both sides, we have pi
∗dbh = dbh. All diffeomorphisms
commute with the exterior derivative, so this implies that dbpi
∗h = dbh. By
the definition of pullback, this implies db(h ◦ pi) = dbh. By linearity of the
exterior derivative, db(h ◦ pi − h) = 0. This implies that h ◦ pi − h = f0.
←. Suppose h◦pi = h+f0. Taking the exterior derivative, we have db(h◦
pi) = dbh. Now, db(h ◦ pi) = db(pi∗h) = pi∗dbh. So pi∗dbh = dbh. Applying
ωab to both sides we have ωabpi∗dbh = ωabdbh. pi∗ is a symplectomorphism
so pi∗ωabdbh = ωabdbh. This is just to say that pi∗H = H.
The truth of this claim is perhaps more easily seen in the coordinate setting
of Hamilton’s equations. Here is a sketch of how it works. Suppose the
Hamiltonian h gives rise to the flow (qi(t), pi(t)). Suppose we canonically
transform the coordinates so that h 7→ h′ and (qi(t), pi(t)) 7→ (Qi(t), Pi(t)).
Since the transformation is canonical, this flow results from plugging in some
Hamiltonian h′ into Hamilton’s equations. Now suppose that this canonical
transformation actually leaves the flow invariant: qi(t) = Qi(t) and pi(t) =
Pi(t), for all i, t. Then we have that ∂h
′/∂pi = ∂h/∂pi and ∂h′/∂qi = ∂h/∂qi
respectively. It follows that h′ = h + f(qi) and h′ = h + g(pi) respectively.
This means that h′ = h+ f0 where f0 is a constant.
This proposition allows us to see the definition of pi-dynamical equiva-
lence as an instance of the observational equivalence schema, with s′ = pi(s),
{fi} = {h}: states s and pi(s) are pi-dynamically equivalent if and only if
h(pi(s)) = h(s) + f0, for all s.
So far, we have talked about dynamical equivalence of states in a gen-
eral and abstract geometrical setting. We now need to understand how these
ideas on the level of the N particle state filter down to the level of the indi-
vidual particles. To this end, we now apply these general geometrical ideas
in the coordinate setting to better understand the functional form of certain
typical Hamiltonians and their symmetries under the permutation maps.
This will in turn motivate a definition of the dynamical indistinguishability
of classical particles.
Consider a system of two particles moving in one dimension along the
x-axis. The four dimensional phase space of this system has points of the
form (r1x, p1x, r2x, p2x), two of which are depicted in Figure 2. According to
the proposition just proved, the states s and pi(s) are dynamically equivalent
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r(a) s = (1,−1, 2, 1).
r
(b) pi(s) = (2, 1, 1,−1).
Figure 2: Two states related by a permutation. In each case, there is one
particle with (r, p) = (1,−1) and another with (2, 1) and yet the states are
represented by two distinct points in the phase space. The black dot depicts
the particle represented by the first factor position and the white dot depicts
the particle represented by the second factor position.
when the Hamiltonian is left invariant (up to an additive constant19) by the
transformation: h(pi(s)) = h(s) + f0.
This is satisfied by h1 = (p
2
1 + p
2
2)/2m. Explicitly, the p1 picks out the
momentum value in the first factor position which is −1 for s. p2 picks out
the momentum value in the second factor position which is 1 for s. When
the Hamiltonian acts on pi(s), p1 picks out 1 and p2 picks out −1 since these
values now occupy different factor positions as a result of applying pi to
s. However, it is clear that it does not matter which value is inserted into
p1 or p2 because of the symmetry of the Hamiltonian: h1(s) = ((−1)2 +
(1)2)/2m = ((1)2 + (−1)2)/2m = h1(pi(s)).
This condition is not satisfied, however, by h2 = (p
2
1+p
2
2)/2m+GMm/r1,
where GM/r1 is the gravitational potential at r1 (the position of the particle
represented by the first factor position) of some fixed, stationary mass M .
h2(s) = ((−1)2+(1)2)/2m+GMm/(1) while h2(pi(s)) = ((1)2+(−1)2)/2m+
GMm/(2) since r1 picks out the value 1 for state s whereas it picks out the
value 2 in state pi(s). It is clear that (in general) h2(s) 6= h2(pi(s)), since
the position and momentum variables pick out different numbers as a result
of the permutation. The fact that h2 is not symmetric in this sense means
that the states s and pi(s) have different dynamical evolutions. s and pi(s)
are dynamically equivalent with respect to h1 but dynamically inequivalent
with respect to h2.
Let us consider a slightly more complicated Hamiltonian of a four particle
system moving in one dimension: h3 = (p
2
1 + p
2
2 + p
2
3 + p
2
4)/2m+ ke1e2/|r13|,
where ke2/|r13| is the electric potential energy term as a function of the
relative distance between the particles represented by factor positions 1 and
3 both with charge e and k is a constant. The particles represented by
factor positions 2 and 4 are neutral. In this case, the Hamiltonian satisfies
19. That the Hamiltonian is only invariant up to an additive constant is not a problem,
since we only ever observe changes in energy anyway.
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h3(s) = h3(pi13(s)) and h3(s) = h3(pi24(s)) for all s but it is not the case that,
in general, h3(s) = h3(pi23(s)) nor h3(s) = h3(pi14(s)). The reason for this is
that particles 1 and 3 are neutral and 2 and 4 have the same electric charge,
so permuting single particle states among those factor positions makes no
difference to the dynamical evolution. However permuting states among
factor positions 1 and 2 for example, would lead to a different dynamical
evolution, since this swaps states between a particle with an electric force
acting on it with a particle with no such force.
These three examples of Hamiltonians motivate a precise definition of
the ‘dynamical indistinguishability’ of classical particles:
Dynamical Indistinguishability. Two particles of an N particle system,
represented by factor positions i and j in the N tuple, are dynamically
indistinguishable if and only if the Hamiltonian h of the system satisfies
h(s) = h(piij(s)) + f0 for all states s.
An immediate consequence of this definition is that the dynamical indis-
tinguishability of the particles is relative to the Hamiltonian; in fixing h,
we make claims about the dynamical indistinguishability of certain particles
in that system. We may link dynamical indistinguishability with the more
intuitive and familiar, albeit less precise, notion of identical particles. This
is best illustrated with an example.
Consider a collection of particles in a gas which are all neutral except
for one charged particle. This particle will, of course, not interact with any
of the neutral particles. If there is no electromagnetic field present, then
there will be no electromagnetic interactions at all, and the Hamiltonian
will contain no electromagnetic potential terms. Although the particle is
charged, this charge is not being exploited by any field; there are no forces
on this particle which depend on this charge, and so the charge is irrelevant
to the dynamical evolution of the system. The charged particle would be
dynamically indistinguishable from the neutral particles, even though they
are not identical. We may change the Hamiltonian by turning on an elec-
tromagnetic field, inducing a force on the charged particle resulting in a
different trajectory than it would have otherwise taken. In virtue of this,
the particle is dynamically distinguishable from the other neutral particles.
This shows that differing intrinsic properties of the particles is a nec-
essary but not sufficient condition for dynamical distinguishability. The
particle must be charged for the field to act only on it with a force, but the
mere fact that it is charged is not sufficient for it to be dynamically distin-
guishable, since it may be treated as neutral if there is no electromagnetic
field present in the system. Thus, while it is necessary that there be some
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difference for the particles to be dynamically distinguishable, it is not neces-
sary that they share all their intrinsic properties for them to be dynamically
indistinguishable. Particles may be dynamically indistinguishable even if
they do in fact differ with respect to certain intrinsic properties, since the
Hamiltonian may be ‘blind’ to those properties.
6 Solving the N ! Problem
In this Section, I show how we may rigorously derive the N ! factor on the
basis of observational equivalence of states, and the observational indistin-
guishability of particles. I will make this argument in the particular case of
dynamical equivalence, since this is the situation that Gibbs and others often
assume, but it is fully generalisable. The result in this Section is a particular
instance of the more general problem of deriving some over-counting correc-
tion factor on the basis of some definition of the observational equivalence
of states.
Let us now consider, for simplicity, the Hamiltonian h =
∑N
i p
2
i /2m. In
this case, all the pii ∈ SN are dynamical symmetries. Thus, given a state
s ∈M , pii(s) ∈M is dynamically equivalent to s for all pii ∈ SN . Therefore,
relative to h, all N particles are dynamically indistinguishable from one
another.
The images of s under each of theN ! permutation maps are in N ! distinct
points in M representing states which are all dynamically equivalent to each
other. Let us now consider instead not the points themselves, but some open
region around the points. Thus, let U be the open region around s ∈ U . We
may now apply the permutation maps to U to generate N ! distinct regions
in M , Ui := pii[U ], such that pii(s) ∈ Ui. Since M is Hausdorff, for any two
of these regions we have that pii(s) ∈ Ui for i = 1, 2 and U1 ∩ U2 is empty.
We may also choose the regions Ui such that they cover M , so we have that
for every s ∈M there is a Ui such that s ∈ Ui and ∪N !i=1Ui = M .
By this construction, the manifold has been partitioned into N ! dynam-
ically equivalent regions; there is no point in M which is not contained in
some Ui and no two points in any one Ui are dynamically equivalent. There-
fore, any one of these regions suffices to completely represent all the obser-
vationally (dynamically, in this case) distinct states of the system. That is,
any one of these regions may be considered to be the sample space: Ω = Ui
for any i. Suppose that this region is equipped with any measure of the
form
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µ(Ui) :=
∫
Ui
P (p, q) dp1...dqn = 1 for some i (16)
where dq...dp = ωn is the symplectic volume form (see footnote 5).
If we now follow Gibbs and let P satisfy Equation (12) (so we let P be
some function of the Hamiltonian), then µ will be preserved under those
canonical transformations pii which are also dynamical symmetries: ω
n is
preserved by canonical transformations and P is preserved by dynamical
symmetries. For the Hamiltonian we are considering, all of the permutations
are dynamical symmetries, therefore
µ(Ui) = 1 for all i (17)
from which, recalling that M = ∪N !i=1Ui, it follows that
µ(M) =
N !∑
i=1
µ(Ui) = N !µ(Ui) = N !. (18)
Therefore, when we want to compute the probability of the system being
in region R ⊆ M using Equation (5) we substitute in Equation (18) to get
P(R) = µ(R)/N !. This concludes the derivation of theN ! factor and justifies
why we must divide the measure of some regionR byN ! to correctly compute
the probability of that region. But I must emphasize that this procedure is
a specific case of a more general and standard statistical procedure. If we
want to compute the probability that the system lies in some region R ⊂M ,
we first compute the measure of that region, µ(R) and then divide by µ(M)
according to Equation (5). Usually it is implicitly assumed that µ(M) = 1;
it is assumed that the manifold is the sample space. One of the main results
of this paper is that this is not always the case and this fact can be used to
solve the N ! problem. In the general case where the sample space is not the
whole manifold, µ(M) 6= 1. In this particular example, µ(M) = N !.
This argument in this Section generalizes: if the Hamiltonian satisfies
h(pi(s)) = h(s) for all s and for all pi ∈ Sn where Sn is some permutation
subgroup of SN , then µ(M) = n!. It may also be the case that the Hamilto-
nian satisfies h(pi(s)) = h(s) for all s and for all pi ∈ Sn and for all pi ∈ Sm
where Sm is an altogether different subgroup. In this case µ(M) = n!m!.
The N ! factor is often perceived as a ‘correction’, indicating that some
reasoning over and above the standard statistical reasoning is needed to
justify its inclusion. What I have shown is that this is not the case. The
N ! arises perfectly naturally in the course of statistical reasoning as the
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normalisation factor µ(M) when all the permutations are dynamical sym-
metries. The reason it is perceived as a correction factor, is because division
by µ(M) = 1 renders itself invisible in cases when the manifold is the sam-
ple space. Thus, when the N ! factor appears, it looks like we have added
something in that was not there before.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have given a solution to the N ! problem, based on the dy-
namical equivalence of the states and the dynamical indistinguishability of
particles, whose precise definitions were inspired by considerations of obser-
vation, and its importance in specifying the sample space of any statistical
theory.
These considerations of observation were key to my analysis. As we saw,
the literature is most focused on whether two states are really ‘one and
the same’ or whether particles are really ‘identical’. This ontological view
of the matter was replaced by the more epistemic notions of observational
equivalence and observational indistinguishability respectively20. But why
take this more ‘epistemic’ route with respect to the N ! problem in statistical
mechanics? The first reason was that the basic object in a statistical the-
ory is the probability space, one of whose elements being the sample space,
typically characterized as containing all and only states which are observa-
tionally distinct from one another. Thus, epistemic notions enter into the
very construction of the mathematical object we study in statistical me-
chanics. The second reason was that the notion of particles sharing intrinsic
properties like mass and charge was best interpreted formally and precisely
in terms of observables; the state of the system only gives us position and
momentum values, so in order to access their mass or charge, we must look
to certain observables like the kinetic energy or the electrical potential, for
example.
The notion of observational equivalence was further narrowed to the
notion of dynamical equivalence, taking the set of observables with respect
to which to judge the equivalence of states to be the singleton set containing
the Hamiltonian. It is granted that dynamical equivalence is not the only
20. I must emphasize at this point that the epistemic flavour of my analysis enters in
the construction of the sample space, before any probability measures are defined on
the space; the epistemic flavour does not enter into the interpretation of the probability
measure. In fact, my analysis here is compatible with any interpretation of statistical
mechanical probabilities: nothing in my argument requires us to make any choice of
probability interpretation.
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sense in which states may be said to be observationally equivalent, and hence
nor is dynamical indistinguishability the only sense in which particles may
be said to be indistinguishable. This is accommodated in my analysis in
the fact that the different senses of particle (in)distinguishability and state
(in)equivalence correspond to different choices of the set {fi}.
Although I have restricted my discussion to classical Hamiltonian me-
chanics, the characterisation of observational and dynamical equivalence I
develop in this paper will carry over straightforwardly to quantum theory;
the characterisation of indistinguishable classical particles in terms of the
permutation symmetry of the Hamiltonian takes the form of the permutation
operator commuting with the Hamiltonian. The framework presented here
therefore promises to make interesting and important connections between
classical and quantum physics in the context of particle indistinguishability.
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